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The Warren Court Has Left the Building:
Some Comments on Contemporary
Discussions of Equality
Sanford Levinson'
As the last speaker on the last panel and, therefore, the "last
word" on the Legal Forum's fascinating conference on the con-
temporary meaning of equality, I want to use my space to try to
link together both the conference's opening and closing presenta-
tions. Both Judge Abner Mikva's' keynote talk,2 as well as the
final talk by Elizabeth Schneider,: illustrate what I believe is an
increasingly important reality of contemporary constitutional dis-
cussion. That is the willingness of persons like Mikva and
Schneider, both of whom, like myself, are identified with the lib-
eral wing of the Democratic Party, to challenge-either explicitly
or implicitly-some of the iconic decisions of the Warren Court.
No one can be surprised if the notably conservative Richard Ep-
stein challenges the doctrinal basis offered by the Court in Gris-
wold v Connecticut;4 he has, after all, devoted his career to
attempting to demolish not only the Warren Court, but even the
post-New Deal court from which the Warren Court emerged. Ep-
stein faces little cognitive dissonance in questioning Earl War-
ren's legacy. What may be surprising is that he is willing at all to
endorse the result in that case, albeit through an emphasis on a
Lochner-based theory of freedom of contract that certainly is con-
gruent with his overall approach to constitutional and political
t W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, Univer-
sity of Texas Law School. I am, as always, extremely grateful for the suggestions of Jack
Balkin after reading an earlier draft of this article.
1 This assumes "Judge" is his proper title. Dean Levmore suggested that the most
truly distinguished office, and thus the proper honorific, is Professor at the University of
Chicago Law School.
2 See Abner Mikva, The Scope of Equal Protection, 2002 U Chi Legal F 1.
3 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's
Rights, 2002 U Chi Legal F 137.
4 381 US 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute banning the use of
contraceptives and holding that married couples are entitled to a zone of privacy).
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issues.! It is far more surprising to hear dissent coming from
those who might ordinarily be expected to embrace the Warren
Court.
I. JUDGES AND THE "POLITICAL THICKET": RECONSIDERING THE
MERITS OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT DECISIONS
I begin with Abner Mikva, who brings to his current post at
the University of Chicago the wisdom generated by one of the
most interesting careers of any American lawyer in the last cen-
tury. He has served with distinction not only in both state and
national legislatures, but also on the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and then in the White House during the
Clinton presidency. As an elected public official he certainly
never made any attempt to hide his liberal political views, and he
is now a warm proponent of resisting efforts of the Bush Admini-
stration to pack the federal judiciary with conservative appoint-
ments.' Some special force, then, attaches to his comments about
his long-running debate with his old friend and jurisprudential
mentor William J. Brennan with regard to the reapportionment
cases generated by Justice Brennan's decision in Baker v Carr.7
Judge Mikva was particularly critical of Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Karcher v Daggett,' which interpreted the
Constitution to require extraordinarily strict mathematical
equality among state congressional districts.9 The Court affirmed
the invalidation of a New Jersey redistricting plan where the de-
viations were well within statistical rates of error in the compu-
tation of population.0 This is only one of a number of cases exem-
plifying the extent to which the Supreme Court was forced (or
gladly chose) to enter the "political thicket,"" and actively partici-
pated in redrawing political boundary lines. Because boundary
5 Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905), is, of course, the canonical citation with
regards to the Court's willingness to emphasize the autonomy enjoyed by members of a
free society and, consequently, the illegitimacy of any regulations that do not serve an
ascertainable general social interest.
6 See, for example, Abner Mikva, Supreme Patience, Wash Post A25 (Jan 25, 2002).
7 369 US 186 (1962) (holding that a plaintiff's challenge to district reapportionment
is not a nonjusticiable political question).
8 462 US 726 (1983) (holding that any deviation from strict proportional equality in
Congressional districting requires legitimate state justification, a standard that, as a
matter of fact, is difficult to satisfy).
" Karcher, 462 US at 732.
'9 Id at 744.
" This term comes from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v Green, 328 US
549, 556 (1946).
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lines are drawn in connection with the decennial census required
by the Constitution, 2 apportionment has become, since the 1960s,
a never-ending task of the federal judiciary. Part of the political
calculus of reapportionment decisions by state legislatures is the
knowledge that, almost inevitably, they will be challenged in
court. Indeed, in states where no one party controls the legisla-
ture and governorship, it sometimes-at least to the party that
sees potentially friendly judges behind the bench-is appealing
simply to allow the process to break down and to go directly to
the judiciary.3
Judge Mikva suggested that the Court's doctrine, especially
with regard to congressional redistricting, relies on a mindless
(my term, not his) commitment to mathematical identity to the
exclusion of other important values implicated in the instantia-
tion of representative democracy. 4 He suggested, among other
things, that experienced politicians (like himself) could do (and in
fact did) a far better job, most of the time, of redistricting than
could judges, not least because most judges (like almost all mem-
bers of the current Supreme Court) have had not a day of experi-
ence running for electoral office and participating in complex leg-
islative institutions."
12 See US Const Art I, § 2, cl 3 ("The actual Enumeration [of state representatives in
the House of Representatives] shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of
the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in
such manner as they shall by Law direct."). This has generally been interpreted as requir-
ing a census every ten years, after which the allocation of seats is decided by Congress in
light of population changes, See, for example, Peter Skerry, Counting on the Census: Race,
Group Identity, an the Evasion of Politics 12 (Brookings 2000).
13 This happened in Texas during the 2001 legislative session, where Democrats and
Republicans made relatively little attempt to settle on a reapportionment map, and repre-
sentatives of each party raced to what they perceived as potentially friendly judicial fora.
See Jim Yardley, Court Thwarts GOP Hopes For Big Gains In Texas Seats, NY Times A20
(Nov 15, 2001); R.G. Ratcliffe, Cornyn Will File Redistricting Map; Attorney General's Plan
to Favor GOP, Houston Chron A15 (Aug 21, 2001); Ed Asher, GOP Voters Want Judges in
Remap Control, Houston Chron A27 (July 26, 2001).
14 Adherence to traditional municipal boundaries could be defended on grounds that
these communities might have a "community of identity" that might otherwise be lacking
if various communities are joined in a common district solely to achieve a magical equality
of numbers with another district. In Baker v Carr, for example, Justice Clark concurred on
the ground that the Tennessee apportionment was in fact a "crazyquilt", 369 US at 254, by
definition unable to survive any significant test of rationality. What happened in Reynolds
v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964), and its accompanying cases, especially Lucas v Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 377 US 713 (1964), was that deviation from equality of population
became, in effect, per se "irrational" inasmuch as the Court rejected the legitimacy of the
majority of Colorado's population, in a referendum, voting to retain rural districts that
would have substantially smaller populations than urban districts.
'5 The one exception on the current Supreme Court is Sandra Day O'Connor, who was
the leader for the Republican majority in the Arizona House of Representatives over her
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Given that the reapportionment decisions are a major part of
the legacy of the Warren Court-and that Judge Mikva is a
warm admirer of that Court-it is telling, I believe, that he spent
most of his keynote, in effect, criticizing the jurisprudence of re-
apportionment. To be sure, some of the criticism was based on the
current Court's remarkable decision in Bush v Gore,'6 which pur-
ported, in its equal protection analysis, to follow the Warren
Court's wisdom;17 to the degree that is plausible, it may be
enough, for some of us, to promote reconsideration of that osten-
sible "wisdom." But Judge Mikva's emphasis on the long-term
nature of his dispute with his friend William Brennan should ex-
culpate him from charges of politically motivated argument.
I should confess that it was Bush v Gore that caused me to
rethink the merits of the reapportionment cases."8 Suffice it to say
that I now find the "one person/one vote" doctrine-or, as I term
it, "mantra"'9 -to be ultimately incoherent in its operation, rais-
ing far more questions than the Court has ever attempted to an-
swer in the almost four decades since its initiation. Representa-
tive problems include the fact that (a) not every person gets a
vote; (b) occasionally, some persons get substantially more than
one vote; and (c) whatever the basis of assigning representation
is, it is not a requirement that representatives have within their
districts an equal number of voters, either potential or actual," as
against persons in general, many of whom, including children,
aliens, and felons, might be ineligible to vote. The doctrine in its
present form satisfies the demands neither of "logic" nor "experi-
ence." ' It is, instead, an ill-woven judicial creation deserving sig-
nificant reconsideration, however much Earl Warren might have
six years of service. Fairness requires acknowledgment of the fact that the Baker-Reynolds
Court was certainly not without political experience. Chief Justice Warren, the author of
Reynolds, had, after all, been Governor of California and had been Thomas E. Dewey's
vice-presidential running mate on the 1948 Republican ticket.
16 Bush v Gore, 531 US 98, 105 (2000).
17 Id (using the history of one person-one vote jurisprudence in Reynolds, 377 US, and
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 388 US 663 (1966), to bolster its equal protection
analysis).
18 For a critique of the reapportionment cases, see Sanford Levinson, One-Person,
One-Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 NC L Rev 1269 (2002).
19 Id.
20 These points are discussed in id.
21 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Lecture I, The Common Law in Sheldon Novick, ed, 3
The Collected Works of Justice Holmes: Complete Public Writings and Selected Judicial
Opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes 115 (Chicago 1995).
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considered Reynolds v Sims" (and, presumably, its progeny) his
highest achievement on the Court.'
It may be, of course, that Reynolds is best understood as a
civil rights case linked with the great epic of the 1960s, the full
entry of African-Americans into the American political commu-
nity. 4 But, of course, cases motivated by the best of intentions
take on what Ronald Dworkin has labeled "gravitational force'
and succeeding generations are forced to adopt relevant doctrinal
parameters even when their consequences may be quite surpris-
ing, given the possible original purposes underlying the doctrine.
Chief Justice Warren, for example, suggested that had regu-
lar reapportionment taken place
fifty years ago we would have saved ourselves actual racial
troubles. Many of our problems would have been solved a
long time ago if everyone had the right to vote and his vote
counted the same as everybody else's."
There are, of course, many theoretical difficulties contained
within the notion of counting votes "the same as everybody
else's."' But ensuing years have allowed us to observe conse-
quences that he almost surely would never have anticipated. One
wonders what Warren would have thought of the fact that lan-
guage like this was used to justify the Supreme Court's interven-
tion into the "political thicket' in Bush v Gore, not to mention
the fact that a primary use of the Equal Protection Clause by the
22 Reynolds, 377 US at 565 (holding that each citizen is entitled to "full and effective
participation" in state government).
See Lucas A. Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics 247 (Belknap 2000).
24 The same is almost certainly true of another Warren Court icon, New York Times v
Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) (holding that recovery in libel action requires "actual mal-
ice"), which is seriously defective in that it ultimately provides insufficient protection
either to genuinely wronged victims of journalistic negligence or to newspapers who must
pay enormous transaction costs to defend themselves against meritless litigation. Far
better than the constitutionalization of substantive libel doctrine would have been to focus
on the remedies, such as limiting awards in libel cases to provable "actual damages" and
thereby excluding potentially open-ended awards like those based on the "pain and suffer-
ing", for example, allegedly experienced by an Alabama public official accused of being
insufficiently solicitous toward the civil rights movement.
25 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 111 (Harvard 1978).
26 These original purposes may not always be stated overtly by a Court concerned
with protecting the feelings of losing parties.
27 Jack H. Pollock, Earl Warren: The Judge Who Changed America 209 (Prentice Hall
1979), quoted in Powe, The Warren Court at 249 (cited in note 23).
28 Id.
29 Colegrove, 328 US at 556.
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contemporary Supreme Court is to prevent so-called "racial ger-
rymanders,"' whatever their presumed reflection of a legislative
belief that such districting is conducive to achieving racial jus-
tice. 3
In any event, it should be increasingly clear that political
liberals, however much they might be tempted to rally around the
Warren Court in response to its conservative antagonists, should
realize that the Court, like all political institutions, was a product
of its own time and context. One might continue to admire the
seriousness with which Chief Justice Warren took the Preamble's
injunction that the Constitution be a mechanism for the estab-
lishment of justice32 without, however, having to defend all of the
Warren Court's decisions as truly functional to that goal. One
need not be an "originalist" to agree with the advice in Federalist
Paper No. 85 to learn from the actual experience of American
politics rather than feel caged within in any given theory.' In-
deed, to the extent that political liberals treat the decisions of the
Warren Court as "the authoritative word" on constitutional mean-
ing, they become all too similar to conservative originalists who
find similarly authoritative words in early texts and ignore the
lessons that "experience"' might teach as to their potential un-
wisdom (and the legitimacy of moving beyond them).
II. ATTACKING PRIVACY DOCTRINE
Judge Mikva began this conference with a sharp, explicit cri-
tique of the reapportionment cases; Elizabeth Schneider ended it
30 Bush v Vera, 517 US 952 (1996) (striking down three majority-minority congres-
sional districts in Texas); Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899 (1996) (striking down North Caro-
lina's majority-black twelfth Congressional district, which was designed to assure the
election of an African-American representative); Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900 (1995)
(striking down Georgia's majority black eleventh Congressional district); Shaw v Reno,
509 US 630 (1993) (holding that racial gerrymanders are subject to strict scrutiny).
31 I am personally uncertain about the merits of racial gerrymandering. To some
extent, I believe that it ends up weakening the political power of racial minorities insofar
as it works often to weaken the overall political power of the Democratic Party, which
remains the predominant party for the minorities who are usually the "beneficiaries" of
racial gerrymandering. But this is obviously a political judgment. It is not remotely clear
why one would believe that federal judges are well-suited to decide a remarkably complex
political issue like the role that race should play in drawing legislative districts.
3' See US Const Preamble ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union [and to] establish Justice ... do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion.").
13 See Federalist 85 (Hamilton), quoting David Hume, in Benjamin Wright, ed, The
Federalist 547 (Harvard 1961).
34 Id.
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by examining the relationship between the concepts of privacy
and equality. Although she recognizes the importance of an "af-
firmative right of privacy, ' she also stresses that "understand-
ings of privacy have to be shaped by the recognition of the prob-
lems""' actually facing women in the quest to become fully equal
members of the social order.
At the very least, her arguments require the possible reas-
sessment of some of the central themes of another icon of the
Warren Court, Griswold v Connecticut.3' Like Epstein, she ap-
proves of the result in Griswold," and, far more than Epstein,
approves of the extension of Griswold's privacy doctrine to protect
reproductive rights in Roe v Wade. Yet she, like Epstein, is un-
comfortable with the emphasis on privacy (rather than "auton-
omy") that is at the heart of the opinions in Griswold, even if she
does not want to junk entirely the recognition of a private realm
protected against state interference.'0 But, I strongly suspect, it is
more important to her to use the legal institutions of the state to
aggressively promote substantive equality for women in all
realms than to legitimate the presence of a "No Legal Interveners
Welcome Here" sign cordoning off from legal control ostensibly
private behavior that acts to the detriment of women. Consider in
this context either the title or ultimate thesis of Jeffrey Rosen's
recent book, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America,4 especially insofar as he is critical of the "hostile envi-
ronment" branch of anti-discrimination law because it licenses far
too many invasions of privacy."
Professor Schneider is, of course, one of the country's leading
analysts of women's rights, particularly with regard to domestic
43
violence. Meaningful protection of women (and, for that matter,
men) against domestic violence, in the name of assuring substan-
tive equality within American society, requires significant refor-
mulation of Griswold's central doctrines and the acceptance of the
35 Schneider, 2002 Chi Legal F at 138 (cited in note 3).
38 Id.
37 Griswold, 381 US 479.
Schneider, 2002 Chi Legal F at 145 (cited in note 3).
39 410 US 113 (1973). Schneider, 2002 Chi Legal F at 139 n 10 (cited in note 3).
40 Id at 138.
41 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Random
House 2000), reviewed in Sanford Levinson, Structuring Intimacy: Some Reflections on the
Fact that the Law Generally Does Not Protect Us Against Unwanted Gazes, 89 Georgetown
L J 2073 (2001).
42 Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 78-89 (cited in note 41).
43 See Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (Yale 2000).
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possibility of quite intrusive gazing by the state. Recall that Jus-
tice Douglas's opinion in Griswold emphasizes the protected
"zone" of marital privacy: "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of pri-
vacy surrounding the marriage relationship." 4 Although Justice
Harlan disagreed with the Court's particular analysis of the deri-
vation of the right to privacy, he certainly agreed that it was vio-
lated in this case.4 He adopted by reference a prior dissenting
opinion in Poe v Ullman,4 which included his statement that "it is
difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a
husband and wife's marital relations," and he found it basically
unthinkable that the state could elicit "testimony as to the mode
and manner of the married couples' sexual relations,"" as would
be required, of course, in order to prove the "crime" of use of
prohibited contraceptives. No doubt liberals of the time, devoted
to a particular conception of a strong split between the public and
private realms of life, thrilled to such language, critical only of
Harlan's (like Douglas's" and Goldberg's °) emphasis on marital
privacy rather than a more generalized right of sexual privacy
protected against invasion from the gaze of the state.
It is glaringly obvious, though, that one must pierce the veil
of the "sacred"5 marital bedroom or any other site of sexual en-
counter if one genuinely wishes to punish domestic violence.52
Consider, for starters, the crime of marital rape, which requires,
among other things, the rejection of the traditional right of the
male to sexual satisfaction from his wife, whatever her own
wishes in the matter. There is, of course, no defense for maintain-
" Griswold, 381 US at 485-86.
45 Id at 499 (Harlan concurring).
46 367 US 497 (1961) (not reaching constitutionality, based on ripeness grounds, of
Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives).
47 Id at 552 (Harlan dissenting).
Id at 548 (Harlan dissenting).
49 Griswold, 381 US at 486.
Id at 495 (Goldberg concurring).
5' Id at 486.
5' And it is true as well that any serious defense of sexual autonomy requires protect-
ing at least some "public" action. See Andrew Koppelman, Feminism and Libertarianism:
A Response to Richard Epstein, 1999 U Chi Legal F 115 (1999). It would be repugnant, for
example, to allow the prosecution of gays and lesbians for public kissing if heterosexuals
are not similarly viewed as "disturbers of the peace" when engaging in public kissing. A
full grasp of this point requires the abandonment of reliance on geographical "zones of
privacy" that almost literally protects only 'closeted" behavior.
126 [2002:
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ing any such "right," and most states have formally abolished it.'
But any charge by a wife that she has been raped by her husband
requires exactly what appalled the fastidious Harlan-evidence
"as to the mode and manner of the married couples' sexual rela-
tions."' To the extent that the defendant cannot be forced to tes-
tify, it is only because of generalized protections against self-
incrimination rather than any particular defense given with re-
gard to testimony about sexual relations. Certainly the complain-
ing witness can testify about the most intimate of encounters.
Political conservatives have often pointed to the potential
conflict between equality and liberty, though they have usually
emphasized liberties associated with private property and the
putative right against redistributive legislation by the state that
funnels resources from haves to have-nots. As Eugene Volokh has
shown, though, traditional freedom of speech norms have been
put under considerable pressure because of the vigorous desire to
ensure the equality of women and protect them against "hostile
work environments." ° Volokh's arguments often build on notions
of protected speech memorably articulated in a variety of Warren
Court decisions protecting political dissidents (who were often
linked with the Civil Rights Movement).6 This is a model example
of what my friend and frequent co-author Jack Balkin has labeled
"ideological drift,"7 which occurs when liberals or conservatives
embrace doctrines that were previously identified with their po-
litical opponents. So today, conservative libertarians like Volokh
seem most willing to cheerlead for speech protective doctrines of
the Warren Court,' while contemporary liberals like Cass Sun-
stein, in effect, accuse avatars of the Warren Court of engaging in
a formalist, absolutist analysis of the First Amendment properly
rejected in the aftermath of the New Deal revolution."9 At that
time, traditional notions of protected liberty were scrapped in
order to make the downtrodden less unequal in material re-
See Jill Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal L
Rev 1373 (2000) (discussing state statutes criminalizing sexual assault on a spouse).
'4 Poe, 367 US at 548 (Harlan dissenting).
5 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L
Rev 1791 at 1811-1812.
TM Id at 1834-1835.
57 J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 Duke L J 375, 383 (1990).
T8 See Volokh, 39 UCLA L Rev at 1834-1835 (cited in note 55).
59 See Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 201 (Harvard 1993) (arguing that the
Constitution is partial inasmuch as the Supreme Court interprets the status quo as a
neutral baseline and ignores the distributional consequences).
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sources.' Today, some would argue," similar incursions into tra-
ditional notions of civil liberty must be accepted, and not only to
achieve greater equality. As we were reminded in the presenta-
tions by Albert Alschuler and Edwin Meese, egalitarian critiques
of racial or (more accurately) national-origin profiling have lost
some of their force since September 11.62
How confident are we, though, about the meaning of the
terms we use in our arguments, including equality or liberty?
Consider the implications of Owen Fiss's comment, in a classic
article analyzing the Equal Protection Clause,' that "[tihe
words-no state shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws'-do not state an intelligible rule
of decision. In that sense the text has no meaning."' What the
Clause does is to "provide[] the Court with a textual platform
from which it can make pronouncements as to the meaning of
equality; it shapes the ideal."' How many of us, though, look to
the Supreme Court for genuine guidance with regard to such ide-
als? One sees instead pervasive doubt about the capacity of the
Supreme Court, whether for practical reasons, like lack of rele-
vant experience, or ideological reasons, to be able to enunciate an
"ideal" or reach truly "intelligible rule[s]" with regard to the in-
credibly complex texture of American life.'
III. THE VIRTUES OF PRAGMATISM
Richard Epstein has advised us to seek (and then, presuma-
bly, to implement) what he memorably called "simple rules for a
complex world."' I am increasingly skeptical not only about Ep-
stein's particular candidates for those ostensibly "simple rules,"
but also, and more importantly, about the belief that one can re-
alistically imagine governing our lives by reference to such rules.
This is, of course, a fundamental topic in legal theory, but one
6 Id at 57-59.
61 See Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 15-16 (Free Press
1993) (articulating the need for "a New Deal for speech").62 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U Chi Legal F
163; The Hon. Edwin Meese, III, Presentation at University of Chicago Legal Forum's
Symposium on "The Scope of Equal Protection" (Oct 27, 2002).
' Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs 107 (1976).
6 Id at 108.
6 Id at 173.
66 See, for example, Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
(Princeton 1999).
67 See Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Harvard 1995).
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might also view Epstein's position within the context of a debate
that appears especially strong these days among denizens of the
distinguished University of Chicago Law School. For Epstein, law
is ultimately a matter of identification of strong, relatively speci-
fiable, principles that can be applied by professionally-trained
adjudicators.
Increasingly opposed to Epstein, though, are Richard Posner
and Cass Sunstein. A naive analyst might not be surprised by
Sunstein's opposition, because, he is, after all, a political liberal;
Posner presents a more interesting case inasmuch as he obvi-
ously shares many of Epstein's conservative political inclinations.
Yet both Posner and Sunstein counsel a far more "pragmatic" ap-
proach to legal analysis that is, in operation, far messier intellec-
tually, rife with intellectual compromise and even inconsistency,
than is true of Epstein's approach. It is hard to imagine Epstein
writing a book titled Overcoming Law" or embracing Sunstein's
call that cases be resolved by reference to "shallow" and "narrow"'
principles that in fact leave future adjudicators with a tremen-
dous degree of latitude to move in other directions when contexts
change. A major aspect of this entire debate is how much cash
value there is in the striving for careful distinctions; the implica-
tion is that the distinctions proffered by an adjudicator should be
able to withstand careful legal/philosophical analysis. But this
might in essence be a category mistake, assuming that the role of
the adjudicator is similar to that of the philosopher or jurist. Per-
haps, instead, it is far closer to the role of a mediator more at-
tuned to seeking solutions to specific controversies, including the
possibility of compromises that may be wanting in "principle," but
may nonetheless have appeal precisely because each side will ex-
hibit sufficient satisfaction to cease their discord. Every negotia-
tor knows that there are times to evade certain issues or to adopt
language that is, if not a full-scale ink blot, at least sufficiently
ambiguous that all sides can hope for some future success in
twisting the language to their own purposes. We should, as Sam-
uel Issacharoff cautioned, be wary about believing that the search
for conceptual closure is the best way to seek solutions to complex
problems.
This is, of course, from one point of view an anti-intellectual
view of what law is about, just the sort of thing that led Owen
m See Richard Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard 1995).
See Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 37 (Harvard 1996).
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Fiss to denounce Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics
alike for threatening "the death of the law"' insofar as pragma-
tism seems ultimately to rely on intuitions regarding what Pos-
ner's favorite philosopher/judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, called
the "felt necessities of the time."7' Indeed, Fiss wrote an interest-
ing, heartfelt critique of his beloved William Brennan when the
Justice defended the importance of "passion" in a speech to the
Bar of the City of New York."2 This represented, for Fiss, a repu-
diation of the essentially deliberative and rationalistic character
of judicial decisions (or, indeed, any decisions that claimed to be
law-based) that would serve, among other things, to separate law
from politics. The plausibility of this model was the chief issue of
twentieth-century American jurisprudential debate," and there is
no reason to think that it will abate in the twenty-first century.
Can anyone plausibly believe, for example, that "equality" is
anything other than a protean term incapable of being cabined
within very specific, "simple" understandings? I note that one of
my favorite books is Equalities." The key argument is contained
in the title: there are, according to Douglas Rae and his Yale col-
leagues, no fewer than 128 logically defensible theories of equal-
ity, none of them clearly the single "best" version. So the question
facing a country committed, with pride, to "Equal Justice Under
Law" or to providing "equal protection of the law" is how to pick
and choose among the many candidates; often, as a practical mat-
ter, this might mean combining, as with a Chinese menu, aspects
of various approaches that point in different directions. A combi-
nation of sweet and sour may produce not only a fine soup, but
also a reasonable resolution, at a given time, to a political contro-
versy, though there is nothing simple in preparing either the
soup or a judicial opinion explaining the result in a given case.
70 See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of Law, 72 Cornell L Rev 1 (1986). I take some pride
in being the first person, I believe, to identify Richard Posner as a right wing crit. See
Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (And Toward Critical Legal Stud-
ies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 Colum L Rev 1221, 1224-1225 (1991).
7 See Holmes, The Common Law at 115 (cited in note 21).
72 See Owen M. Fiss, The Other Goldberg, in Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent,
eds, The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values 229 (Cornell 1992),
discussing William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and the Progress of the Law, 10 Car-
dozo L Rev 3 (1988).
73 See, for example, Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-
1960, 265-268 (Oxford 1992) (discussing Herbert Wechsler's notion that the law is based
on "neutral principles"); see generally, Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Har-
vard 1997).
'4 Douglas Rae, et al, Equalities (Harvard 1981).
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Or let us return to the term "privacy," which became a
vaunted concept in large part because of Griswold. Yet even the
most ardent devotees of that decision must acknowledge the truth
of Justice Black's comment in his Griswold dissent that it "is a
broad, abstract and ambiguous concept."' Its conceptual reach
ranges from the ability to keep secrets to the exercise of various
76forms of autonomy and, as seen earlier, we may often want to
limit its domain because of the felt importance of protecting other
important values, such as the ability of women to protect them-
selves against domestic violence.
What this means, then, is that law, for all of its professed
foundation in reason and the power of disciplined analysis, is ir-
reducibly messy in actual operation. The inevitable question is
how we learn to live with this messiness. To what extent should
we continue to profess that the Constitution (or any court that
purports to speak in the name of the Constitution) resolves (at
least some) of the messiness rather than instantiating it? And to
what extent ought we look to judges to resolve the messiness by
issuing what seem at times little more than fiat judgments about
the ways we should balance values like liberty and equality
against one another?
These questions do not submit to easy answers, especially in
a necessarily truncated essay like this one. Suffice it to say for
now that I find the Constitution relatively unhelpful in providing
genuine guidance with regard to concerns like the meaning of
equality or of privacy. It is not that I believe that every last as-
pect of the Constitution is equally indeterminate. Indeed, as I
have written elsewhere, I increasingly see the Constitution as
imprisoning the American polity within an institutional "iron
cage"77 that ill serves us as we enter the new millennium. Con-
sider, for example, the inequality instantiated in the United
States Senate.78 Of course, someone strongly committed to a cer-
tain view of federalism would reply that the Senate-or what I
76 Griswold, 381 US at 509 (Black dissenting).
76 See Sanford Levinson, Privacy, in Kermit Hall, ed, The Oxford Companion to the
Supreme Court, 671, 672-73 (Oxford 1992).
77 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 181-82
(Routledge 1992) (describing capitalism as engendering an ideological "iron cage" within
which we live). I adopt and extend this metaphor, with reference to living under the
United States Constitution, in Sanford Levinson, Bush v Gore and the French Revolution:
A Tentative List of Some Early Lessons, 65 L & Contemp Probs 7 (2002).
78 See US Const, Art I, § 3, cl 1 ('The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State.").
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have described elsewhere as the truly "stupid" rule by which
deadlocks in the Electoral College would be broken in the House
of Representatives on a one state-one vote basis"--simply recog-
nizes the equality or what the Supreme Court has taken in recent
years to referring to as the "dignity" of each "sovereign" state.80
The fact that I regard such a response as pernicious does not
mean that it is illogical or that it does not state a view of equality
that has deep roots in American political thought.
IV. IDEOLOGICAL DRIFT
In many ways, the primary point of this essay is to demon-
strate the extent of ideological drift that is increasingly mani-
fested in contemporary constitutional debate, whether with re-
gard to the meanings of free speech or "privacy" or the wisdom of
judicial intervention into the redistricting process-not to men-
tion judicial selection of the President of the United States! What
this demonstrates, among other things, is that legal rules are se-
lected to resolve given problems rather than chosen behind a veil
of ignorance in which the decision-maker has no idea who will
benefit. This commitment to legal instrumentalism is not a result
of devotion to a particular legal theory called "legal instrumental-
ism." Rather, the kind of people who become judges in the United
States-unlike, perhaps, Europe-usually come out of at least
some kind of political background. At the very least, in the
United States, a federal judge is someone who knows a senator or
a president; in a state like Texas, a judge must survive a partisan
political election. Judges are placed on the bench in order to
achieve certain kinds of political agendas and, just as impor-
tantly, they bring to the bench certain political views that gener-
ate interpretations of existing rules that will push the law in ju-
dicially preferred directions.
As Jack Balkin has written, "A solution to problem A at Time
1 may not be a particularly good way of solving Problem B at
Time 2. Hence drift is inevitable,"" especially if what one recog-
'9 See Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, in
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, eds, Constitutional Stupidities, Constitu-
tional Tragedies 61-66 (NYU 1998).
80 See, for example, Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 715 (1999) ("[States] are not rele-
gated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though
not the full authority, of sovereignty.").
81 Email from Jack Balkin to Sanford Levinson (Mar 28, 2002) [on file with U Chi
Legal F].
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nizes as a problem in the first place-and then recognizes as
purported solutions to the problem-is a function of ideological
commitments.
This essay has moved in its latter stages toward a considera-
tion of the opposition between jurisprudential "pragmatism," on
the one hand, and the search for comprehensive intellectual
structures that provide answers to most legal dilemmas. What is
the relationship between the beginning and end of this essay?
Return to Richard Epstein's emphasis on the desirability of
seeking, and then enacting, "simple rules for a complex world."
But it was not the case that the Warren Court, for example, es-
chewed "simple rules." Indeed, one can analyze the reapportion-
ment decisions over time as moving toward ever more simple
(and simplistic) rules. Yet it is now the case that political liberals
seem more disheartened by these developments even as political
conservatives embrace them, given patterns of instrumental us-
age of these doctrines by a Republican-dominated judiciary. So
one question for those persuaded by Epstein's views is why they
believe that their own favorite rules, even if we could reduce
them to writing and agree that they were in fact "simple," would
not suffer the same fate. As Balkin argues, "The very fact that the
rules are so simple and the world is so complex (and continuously
changing, to boot) means that [Epstein's] rules will be sitting
ducks for various forms of ideological drift. Earl Warren offered
simple rules for a complex world and look where it got him."'2
An obvious temptation, then, is to turn to pragmatism, which
means not only a reliance on balancing and multi-factor tests, but
also, and just as importantly, a willingness to criticize the search
for-or practical possibility of implementing-overarching prin-
ciples, simple or not. And the embrace of complexity has brought
with it the acknowledgment both of the desirability of compro-
mise and, linked with this, the wisdom of leaving most (if not all)
major decisions to Congress. Contemporary liberals like Sunstein
are scarcely less devoted to the mantra of "judicial restraint" than
were most conservatives in the 1960s. Embrace of pragmatism by
political liberals may simply be the result of a prudent calculation
that this will better preserve the Warren Court's political agenda
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Interestingly enough, few conservatives have enlisted in the
ranks of the self-consciously "pragmatic," save for the sui generis
Richard Posner, who, among other things, may simply be too in-
tellectually honest to be able to profess the traditional faith in
abstract legal analysis. Consider in this context a fascinating de-
bate about the legal provenance of Bush v Gores" that took place
in May 2001 between Judge Posner and Geoffrey Stone, former
dean of the University of Chicago Law School." One subject
raised in the debate was the legitimacy of the equal protection
analysis set out in the per curiam opinion signed by five justices.
Stone argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas could not possibly have had a genuine commitment
to the teachings of the Warren Court, on which the opinion relied.
As it happens, Posner had no trouble agreeing that the three Jus-
tices "don't believe in that equal protection stuff.". He explained
their willingness to sign an opinion that they almost certainly did
not believe in by reference to the Justices' desire to avoid an un-
seemly end to the Florida election resulting from simply adding
up the votes from one opinion (by Kennedy and O'Connor), re-
jected by seven justices, and another by Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas, rejected by six Justices."
"It's very difficult to argue constitutional law," said Stone in
response,
with someone who defines himself as so cynical about con-
stitutional law that he thinks it's legitimate for three jus-
tices of the Supreme Court to endorse an opinion that they
believe to be false and unacceptable and not persuasive in
order to avoid having an illegitimate result.87
Stone suggested that Posner's views gave aid and comfort to
those "skeptical students" at the University of Chicago (and, pre-
sumably, elsewhere) who ask "'Isn't constitutional law just poli-
tics in black robes?' 'Don't the justices just vote their political
531 US 98 (2000).
84 See Patricia Manson, Provost Stone and Judge Posner Discuss Judicial Decision-
making, Chi Daily L Bull (May 24, 2001), available online at <httpJ/www.
law.uchicago.edu/news/posner-stone-debate.html> (visited Nov 15, 2002) [on file with U
Chi Legal F]. At the time of the debate, Stone was still provost of the University of Chi-
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preferences?' 'Isn't all this stuff about the Constitution really a
charade?"
Posner replied that he did not "understand why constitu-
tional law professors teach fairy tales to their students," one of
which, presumably, is that abstract fidelity to law takes prece-
dence over what Posner described as achieving "practical solu-
tions to practical problems. 9
It should be absolutely obvious that a self-conscious embrace
of the virtues of balancing may end up simply making it easier for
one's favorite doctrines (including rules) to be effectively neutral-
ized or co-opted by one's political adversaries, whether the liberal
Sunstein or the conservative Posner. And it should be equally
obvious that the attraction of "judicial restraint" is, as a practical
matter, a function of one's comparative perceptions of the politi-
cal colorations of legislatures, presidents, and judges at any given
time.
All of this suggests, not at all surprisingly, that one can best
explain the doctrinal developments both within the Warren Court
and its contemporary, far more conservative, counterpart by ref-
erence to profound changes in the overarching structure of eco-
nomic, political and social forces within the United States and,
for that matter, the world at large, during the last three decades.
On occasion this has led the contemporary Court to signal its dis-
taste for its predecessor by overt overruling of prior decisions,
just as the so-called "Roosevelt Court" did what it could to bury
certain cases associated with the pre-New Deal era. But judges
have a vested interest in emphasizing continuity as well, lest the
public be reinforced in the belief that law is best understood, as
Mr. Dooley suggested, in terms of election returns. The clever use
of existing doctrines to achieve political agendas contrary to those
of their initial supporters is precisely how we recognize the phe-
nomenon of ideological drift.
Manson, Provost Stone, Chi Daily L Bull (cited in note 84).8 Id.
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